

Message Text

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ACTION NODS-00

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /001 W
-----129557 051927Z /42
O 051719Z APR 78 ZFF6
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2400
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE
WHITE HOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 4 TEL AVIV 4580

EXDIS -- DIST AS NODIS

FOR THE SECRETARY FROM THE AMBASSADOR

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PGOV, PEPR, XF, IS, US, EG, JO
SUBJECT: NEXT STEPS IN THE MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS

REF: A) STATE 080954, B) STATE 84644, C) CAIRO 9861,
D) TEL AVIV 4501, E) TEL AVIV 4511, F) STATE 87126

SUMMARY: IN THE PAST FIVE DAYS I HAVE HAD LONG TALKS
WITH DAYAN, PERES, WEIZMAN AND BEGIN IN AN EFFORT
TO SEEK ENLIGHTENMENT ON HOW WE MIGHT BEST PROCEED IN OUR
TACTICS, IF NOT STRATEGY, IN THE PERIOD IMMEDIATELY AHEAD.
DAYAN URGED THAT WE PROMPTLY PRESENT ISRAEL WITH OUR
FULLY ELABORATED PEACE PLAN SO THAT BEGIN AND THE CABINET
CAN WEIGH ITS ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES IN THIER
ENTIRETY. HE INSISTS THAT THE CABINET WILL NOT RESPOND
TO THE TYPE OF "SALAMI TACTICS" WE ARE NOW USING. HE
STRESSED THAT THE PLAN MUST CARRY WITH IT ASSURANCES THAT
SADAT COULD ACCEPT IT AND NOT SIMPLY BE A PACKAGE OF
"AMERICAN IDEAS" WHICH MAY OR MAY NOT FIND EGYPTIAN
SUPPORT. ALTHOUGH HE WAS FAR FROM CERTAIN, IF WE
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FOLLOWED SUCH A COURSE HE THOUGHT THERE MIGHT WELL BE A
CABINET MAJORITY (WITH OR WITHOUT BEGIN) IN SUPPORT OF
THE CONCESSIONS NEEDED FOR AN AGREEMENT WITH EGYPT.
IN MY TALK WITH PERES I SOUGHT HIS REACTIONS TO A
HYPOTHETICAL SITUATION SIMIALR TO THAT DESCRIBED ABOVE.
HE BELIEVES IT WOULD BE A SERIOUS ERROR TO TABLE ANY
AMERICAN PLAN IN THE NEAR FUTURE. BEGIN WOULD QUICKLY

TURN IT TO HIS POLITICAL ADVANTAGE, THEREBY PROLONGING THE PERIOD IN WHICH ISRAEL FAILS TO MAKE THE NECESSARY DECISIONS. HE THINKS IT WILL BE AT LEAST ANOTHER SIX MONTHS BEFORE A NEW, MORE MODERATE GOVERNMENT COALITION COULD BE FORMED. IN THE INTERIM HE THINKS NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE EGYPTIANS CAN AND SHOULD BE STRETCHED OUT WITHOUT CREATING AN ARTIFICIAL CRISIS WHICH WOULD STRENGTHEN BEGIN'S POLITICAL POSITION AND PRODUCE MORE NEGOTIATING RIGIDITY RATHER THAN LESS.

WEIZMAN BELIEVES IT ESSENTIAL THAT DAYAN BE BROUGHT BACK INTO THE CENTER OF THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS. HE THINKS THAT WORKING CLOSELY TOGETHER (WHICH HE SAYS THEY ARE NOT DOING VERY WELL THESE DAYS) HE AND DAYAN MAY BRING BEGIN ALONG, IF WE AND SADAT STOP "TEARING HIM DOWN." HE SEES MERIT IN A TWO-TRACK APPROACH IN THE NEXT WEEKS WITH HIM ON THE CAIRO TRACK AND DAYAN ON THE WASHINGTON TRACK. HE DOES NOT FAVOR OUR TABLING A FULL-BLOWN U.S. PLAN AT THIS POINT. IN HIS JUDGMENT IT WOULD MERELY SERVE TO REINFORCE THE PARANOID INSTINCTS OF BEGIN AND HIS CABINET.

BEGIN, AS YOU KNOW FROM MY REPORT YESTERDAY, SHOWED FAINT SIGNS OF A WILLINGNESS TO RECONSIDER SOME ASPECTS OF HIS POSITIONS. BUT HE WILL WANT TO GO VERY SLOWLY AND WILL NOT REACT POSITIVELY TO BEING PUSHED OUT OF HIS CORNER.

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RECOMMENDATION: THAT WE NOT THROW ALL OUR DICE ON THE TABLE NOW AS DAYAN SUGGESTS. OUR NEXT STEP SHOULD BE TO GET DOWN TO REAL CASES WITH DAYAN IN WASHINGTON IN AN EXAMINATION OF OUR IDEAS ON THE WEST BANK, GAZA, AND ABOUT SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS. HE SHOULD HAVE A MORE DETAILED ACCOUNT OF OUR VIEWS OF THE KINDS OF ULTIMATE CHOICES THE ISRAELI CABINET IS GOING TO HAVE TO FACE, BUT NOT A FORMAL AMERICAN PEACE PLAN TO BRING BACK. IF WEIZMAN HEARS SOME OF THE SAME MUSIC IN CAIRO, THE IMPACT WILL BE REINFORCED ON BEGIN AND THE CABINET. I URGE THAT FOR THE NEXT MONTH OR TWO WE GIVE DAYAN AND WEIZMAN THE CHANCE TO PUCH AS FAR AS POSSIBLE DOWN THEIR SEPARATE BUT PARALLEL TRACKS. IF WE DO GO PUBLIC WITH OUT PLAN

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INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE
WHITE HOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 4 TEL AVIV 4580

EXDIS -- DIST AS NODIS

FOR THE SECRETARY FROM THE AMBASSADOR

IN THE NEAR FUTURE, GIVEN THE COMPLEXITIES OF THE
PRESENT POLITICAL SITUATION HERE, I THINK WE WILL BE
CREATING A SITUATION IN WHICH THE ISRAELIS AND THEIR
AMERICAN SUPPORTERS WILL CREDIBLY BE ABLE TO ACCUSE
THE ADMINISTRATION OF GROSS UNFAIRNESS. THIS WOULD
ONLY FURTHER COMPLICATE PROGRESS TOWARD OUR ULTIMATE
OBJECTIVE. END SUMMARY.

1. ASSUME YOU WILL BE REVIEWING MIDDLE EAST STRATEGY
AND TACTICS IN THE NEXT DAY OR SO FOR THE PERIOD IMMEDIATELY
AHEAD. REFTELS D AND E SUMMARIZE LATEST WEIZMAN AND
BEGIN VIEWPOINTS. WOULD LIKE TO OFFER SOME ADDITIONAL
THOUGHTS OF MY OWN AND TO SUMMARIZE SOME PRIVATE CONVER-
SATIONS I HAVE RECENTLY HAD WITH DAYAN AND PERES WHICH
BEAR DIRECTLY ON OUR JUDGMENTS CONCERNING FUTURE TACTICS,
IF NOT STRATEGY.

2. FIRST, DAYAN. BEFORE HE LEFT FOR ROMANIA, I HAD AN
OPPORTUNITY OVER LUNCH ON MARCH 31 TO EXPLORE HIS THINKING
ALONG THE LINES OF YOUR INSTRUCTION TO ME (REF A). REVIEWED
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THE BIDDING AS IT STOOD AT THE END OF YOUR MARCH 22 MEETING
WITH HIM, AND ASKED WHETHER HE HAD DONE ANY FURTHER THINKING
ABOUT THE NATURE OF THE REVIEW OF WEST BANK/GAZA STATUS
OR OTHER RELATED MATTERS. I THINK DAYAN HAD BEEN LAYING
FOR ME, BECAUSE HE SEEMED TO HAVE THOUGHT THROUGH CARE-
FULLY HIS RESPONSE. HE HAD RECEIVED ONLY A PRELIMINARY
REPORT AT THAT POINT ON WEIZMAN'S TRIP TO CAIRO, BUT HE
WAS ASSUMING THAT IT WOULD NOT CHANGE HIS THINKING VERY

MUCH. INDEED, HE TELEPHONED ME LATER TO SAY THAT AFTER HEARING ALL ABOUT THE WEIZMAN-SADAT CONVERSATIONS, HE STILL BELIEVED THAT THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS WAS ESSENTIALLY STALLED AND THAT THE IDEAS HE HAD EXPRESSED TO ME AT LUNCH REMAINED VALID.

3. AT THAT LUNCH, DAYAN SAID HE HAD RELUCTANTLY CONCLUDED THERE IS NOW WAY TO ACHIEVE AN AGREED DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES BY THE PRESENT ROUTE. THE ISRAELI CABINET WILL SIMPLY NOT RESPOND TO THE KIND OF "SALAMI TACTICS" WHICH ARE BEING USED. TO CONCEDE THE SORT OF LANGUAGE WHICH SADAT IS CONVINCED HE NEEDS FOR THE DECLARATION, WITHOUT KNOWING MORE CLEARLY WHAT THE OVERALL PEACE ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE WEST BANK AS WELL AS FOR SINAI AND GAZA WOULD LOOK LIKE, IS TOO THREATENING A PROSPECT FOR THE ISRAELIS. WE WILL NOT BE ABLE TO SOLVE THE PROBLEM BY SLOWLY PRESSING THE ISRAELIS ON ONE PHRASE AND THEN ANOTHER IN HOPES OF ACHIEVING A DECLARATION AND ONLY THEN MOVING ON TO MORE FUNDAMENTALS.

4. DAYAN SAID THAT IT WOULD BE BEST FOR THE U.S. TO PRESENT ISRAEL WITH ITS FULLY ELABORATED PLAN FOR PEACE, INCLUDING ITS LANGUAGE FOR A DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES, SO THAT BEGIN AND THE CABINET CAN WEIGH THE PROMISE AND RISK ELEMENTS IN THEIR ENTIRETY. IT WOULD NOT BE

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NECESSARY TO DRAW PRECISE LINES ON MAPS, BUT THE CABINET SHOULD HAVE THE CHANCE TO SEE AND UNDERSTAND THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES WITH SOME SUBSTANTIAL SPECIFICITY OF WHAT WE BELIEVE NECESSARY TO RESOLVE BOTH THE PALESTINIAN AND THE SINAI QUESTIONS. (HE LEFT GOLAN OUT OF THE DISCUSSION ENTIRELY.) HE STRESSED THAT OUR PLAN MUST BE SOMETHING WE COULD ASSURE THE ISRAELIS SADAT WOULD ACCEPT--NOT JUST "AMERICAN IDEAS" WHICH SADAT WOULD THEN REJECT EVEN IF THE ISRAELI CABINET COULD BRING ITSELF TO SWALLOW THEM. IF WE FOLLOWED THIS COURSE, HE DID NOT KNOW WHAT THE OUTCOME WOULD BE, BUT HE THOUGHT THERE MIGHT WELL BE A MAJORITY IN THE CABINET FOR THE SORT OF OVERALL CONCESSIONS REQUIRED IN ORDER TO ACHIEVE PEACE WITH EGYPT. WHEN I ASKED, HE SAID HE DID NOT NECESSARILY THINK THAT BEGIN, HOWEVER, WOULD BE PART OF SUCH A MAJORITY.

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EXDIS -- DIST AS NODIS

FOR THE SECRETARY FROM THE AMBASSADOR

OM FRANKLY, I WAS SKEPTICAL. I PRESSED HIM HARD TO TRY TO SEE IF BEHIND HIS LOGIC WAS INDEED SOME KIND OF PROVOCATION--WITH THE THOUGHT IN MIND THAT BEGIN'S HAND WOULD BE STRENGTHENED POLITICALLY THE MINUTE SUCH A COMPREHENSIVE AMERICAN PLAN IS PRESENTED TO THE CABINET AND INEVITABLY BECOMES KNOWN. DAYAN'S RESPONSES WERE REASSURING, ALTHOUGH I CANNOT PUT THIS POSSIBILITY COMPLETELY OUT OF MIND. WHAT WEIGHS AGAINST IT IS MY JUDGMENT THAT DAYAN HIMSELF IS DEEPLY AND GENUINELY DETERMINED SOMEHOW TO WREST PEACE FROM THE PRESENT OPPORTUNE MOMENT, KNOWING FULL WELL IT IS LIKELY TO BE HIS LAST CHANCE. HE HAS SPENT MOST OF HIS WAKING HOURS SINCE HE BECAME FOREIGN MINISTER LAST JUNE TRYING TO FIGURE OUT HOW TO MAKE PEACE WITH EGYPT. I HONESTLY DO NOT BELIEVE HE WOULD MAKE THIS SUGGESTION TO US AT THIS JUNCTURE UNLESS HE BELIEVED IT WOULD HELP RATHER THAN HINDER THAT CAUSE. IT COULD ALSO REFLECT HIS OWN PERSONAL FRUSTRATION, POLITICAL WEAKNESS, AND PESSIMISM ABOUT HIS CHANCES OF BRINGING BEGIN AROUND WITHOUT MORE SHOCK TREATMENT AND MORE OPEN ALLIES.

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6. THE NEXT EVENING BY CHANCE I SAW PERES AT A BUFFET DINNER, GOT HIM OFF IN THE CORNER, AND DURING THE CONVERSATION FOUND A WAY TO FLOAT THIS IDEA HYPOTHETICALLY WITH HIM FOR REACTION. PERES' VIEW WAS DIAMETRICALLY OPPOSITE TO DAYAN'S. HE SEES BEGIN' POLITICAL POSITION STILL STRONG AT THIS POINT, DESPITE THE EVENTS OF THE

LAST TWO MONTHS. HE DOES NOT BELIEVE BEGIN WILL BE ABLE TO BRING HIMSELF TO MAKE THE NECESSARY ACCOMMODATIONS ON 242 IN PARTICULAR; NONETHELESS, HE THINKS THE NEGOTIATIONS WITH EGYPT CAN AND SHOULD BE EXTENDED FOR A NUMBER OF MONTHS WITHOUT CREATING AN ARTIFICIAL CRISIS. IF AN AMERICAN PLAN WERE TABLED IN THE NEAR FUTURE, PERES BELIEVES BEGIN WOULD TURN IT QUICKLY TO HIS POLITICAL ADVANTAGE AND GREATLY PROLONG THE PERIOD IN WHICH ISRAEL FAILS TO COME TO GRIPS WITH THE DECISIONS IT MUST SOON TAKE. IF ON THE OTHER HAND THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS IS ALLOWED TO CONTINUE WITHOUT ARTIFICIAL DISRUPTION, PERES THINKS THE CHANCES ARE GOOD THAT INTERNAL CONTRADICTIONS IN THE COALITION WILL BRING THE DMC TO LEAVE IT AND PAVE THE WAY FOR A NEW GOVERNMENT COALITION MORE MODERATE ON FOREIGN POLICY. HOWEVER, HE SAYS THAT "HE NEEDS ANOTHER SIX MONTHS BEFORE THIS COULD POSSIBLY OCCUR." PERES QUIZZED ME A GOOD DEAL ABOUT THE NATURE OF THE STICKING POINTS BETWEEN THE ISRAELI POSITION AND THE EGYPTIAN, ESPECIALLY ABOUT THE 242 QUESTION. HE WILL BE SEEING YOU SHORTLY IN WASHINGTON I BELIEVE, AND YOU CAN PROBE HIS THINKING FURTHER AT THAT TIME.

7. IN MY MEETING MONDAY WITH EZER WEIZMAN (REF D), AND IN ANOTHER LONG PRIVATE TALK TODAY EN ROUTE TO THE USS NIMITZ, HE REFLECTED ON THE DELICATE SITUATION HE IS IN AT PRESENT. ONE OF HIS STRONGEST REQUESTS IS THAT WE DO SECRET

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EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO GET DAYAN BACK IN TO THE CENTER OF THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS. HE ADMITS THAT THEY ARE NOT "PULLING TOGETHER VERY WELL" AT PRESENT, IS BAFFLED BY DAYAN'S LACK OF ASSERTIVENESS, AND KNOWS CLEARLY HIS OWN LIMITATIONS AS A DIPLOMATIC SUBSTITUTE FOR AN EXPERIENCED FOREIGN MINISTER. WORKING CLOSELY TOGETHER, HE THINKS THEY JUST MAY BE ABLE TO BRING BEGIN ALONG--IF WE AND SADAT QUIT "TEARING BEGIN DOWN." WEIZMAN THINKS THAT HE CAN CONTINUE HIS DIALOGUE WITH SADAT FOR A LITTLE WHILE YET, THOUGH CERTAINLY NOT INDEFINITELY. FAR FROM WANTING THE U.S. OUT OF THE ACT, WEIZMAN WOULD LIKE VERY MUCH TO SEE DAYAN GO TO WASHINGTON SOON AND RESUME THE DIALOGUE WITH US OVER THE DECLARATION AND THE ELEMENTS OF A POTENTIAL WEST BANK/GAZA SETTLEMENT. HE SEES A UTILITY IN A TWO-TRACK APPROACH FOR THE NEXT WEEKS, WITH HIM ON THE CAIRO TRACK AND DAYAN ON THE WASHINGTON TRACK, WITH BARAK PARTICIPATING IN BOTH AND PROVIDING A KEY TECHNICAL LINK BETWEEN THE DISCUSSIONS. HE DOES NOT THINK THE TABLING OF A FULL-BLOWN U.S. PLAN WOULD HELP MATTERS; HE BELIEVES RATHER THAT IT WOULD REINFORCE ALL OF BEGIN'S AND THE CABINET'S MOST PARANOID INSTINCTS.

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WHITE HOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE

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EXDIS -- DIST AS NODIS

FOR THE SECRETARY FROM THE AMBASSADOR

8. AND FINALLY, OF COURSE, BEGIN. AS REPORTED IN REF E, HE IS ANXIOUS FOR DAYAN TO COME TO WASHINGTON AND FOR NEGOTIATIONS TO GO FORWARD BOTH IN CAIRO AND IN WASHINGTON. HE SHOWED SOME VERY SLIGHT HINTS TO ME OF WILLINGNESS TO RECONSIDER SOME ASPECTS OF HIS POSITIONS. THIS MAY BE WHOLLY COSMETIC AND INTENDED ONLY TO PERSUADE US TO SPIN OUT THE NEGOTIATIONS AND NOT TO PRESENT HIM WITH OUR OWN PLAN. BUT I HAVE A SENSE THAT WEIZMAN'S EXPLORATIONS IN CAIRO HAVE FURTHER CONVINCED BEGIN THAT HE IS BETWEEN A ROCK AND A HARD PLACE, AND THAT IF WE DO NOT PUSH THE PACE TOO FAST HE AND HIS EVEN MORE TROUBLED CABINET COLLEAGUES MAY BEGIN TO FACT UP TO SOME OF THE HARD DECISIONS THEY HAVE THUS FAR BEEN ABLE TO EVADE.

9. FROM ALL THIS I CONCLUDE THAT WE SHOULD NOT RPT NOT THROW ALL THE DICE ON THE TABLE AT THIS POINT AS DAYAN SUGGESTS. BUT I DO THINK HE HAS A REAL POINT. STATE 87128, JUST RECEIVED, BRINGS THE GOOD NEWS THAT YOU WILL BE HAPPY TO HAVE HIM COME TO WASHINGTON NEXT WEEK. I KNOW HOW TIGHT YOUR SCHEDULE MUST BE. NONE-
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THELESS, I HOPE YOU CAN SET ASIDE ENOUGH TIME TO SPEND WITH HIM TO GET DOWN TO REAL CASES ON OUR IDEAS ABOUT THE WEST BANK AND GAZA, AND ABOUT SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS. WITHOUT GIVING HIM A FORMAL PLAN TO BRING BACK AND WHICH WE WOULD HAVE THEN HANGING OVER US AS THE "AMERICAN-IMPOSED SOLUTION," WE SHOULD TRY NOW TO LAY OUT IN MORE DETAILED FASHION THE KINDS OF ULTIMATE CHOICES THE ISRAELI CABINET IS GOING TO HAVE TO FACE IF IT IS NOT TO LOSE THE CHANCE OF PEACE WITH EGYPT. WHILE WE ARE DOING THIS WITH DAYAN, WEIZMAN WILL BE GETTING DEEPER INTO THE PRACTICAL WEST BANK/GAZA ISSUES WITH SADAT. IF WEIZMAN AND DAYAN HEAR ROUGHLY THE SAME MUSIC, THE IMPACT WILL BE REINFORCED ON BEGIN AND THE CABINET.

10. TO MAKE

YOUR MEETING WITH DAYAN MOST EFFECTIVE, WE SHOULD TRY TO PROVIDE HIM SEVERAL ALTERNATIVES FOR SOME OF THE TOUGHER POTENTIAL OUTCOMES. FOR EXAMPLE, THE LIMITED PLEBISCITE IDEA IS GOING TO BE THE HARDEST OF ALL TO SELL HERE. WE HAVE SOME GOOD ARGUMENTS FOR IT, BUT WE ALSO NEED TO SUGGEST ONE OR TWO ALTERNATIVE WAYS IN WHICH THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE MIGHT SAFELY BE EXPRESSED WHICH COULD BE PUT ON THE TABLE FOR DISCUSSION AS WELL.

1. FORM THE REPORTS WE NOW HAVE ON THE SADAT-WEIZMAN TALKS, SADAT FINALLY DISCUSSED WITH WEIZMAN SOME OF THE CONCRETE, PRACTICAL DETAILS OF HOW A WEST BANK/GAZA REGIME MIGHT BE ORGANIZED. WE DON'T HAVE PRECISELY WHAT HE SAID, FROM EITHER PARTY, SO FAR AS I CAN TELL. BUT WEIZMAN AGREES WITH MY INTERPRETATION THAT HE AND SADAT HAVE NOW DE FACTO TAKEN UP POINT B OF OUR ORIGINAL JERUSALEM POLITICAL COMMITTEE AGENDA. THE DEBATE IS FINALLY OPEN, AND A DAYAN VISIT TO WASHINGTON NEXT WEEK WOULD BE
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THE RIGHT MOMENT TO REVEAL MUCH OF THE REST OF OUR THINKING; WITHOUT HOWEVER, I REPEAT, PRESENTING HIM WITH THE "AMERICAN PLAN" TO BRING BACK. (IN FACT WHEN I WAS TALKING TO DAYAN ABOUT HIS IDEA, HE SAID THAT HE SHOULD BE THE LAST ONE TO PRESENT AN AMERICAN PLAN TO THE ISRAELI CABINET. HE THOUGHT IT SHOULD EITHER COME THROUGH ME OR THROUGH ROY ATHERTON, AND BE DELIVERED HERE RATHER THAN IN WASHINGTON. THIS REFLECTS HIS WELL-KNOWN APPREHENSION ABOUT BEING THE CONVEYER OF BAD NEWS FROM THE UNITED STATES.)

12. THE DUST HAS NOW SETTLED AFTER BEGIN' VISIT TO WASHINGTON. AS WE THOUGHT, HE IS STILL VERY MUCH IN THE POLITICAL SADDLE. WEIZMAN'S TRIAL BALLOON PROVED TO BE AS LONG LASTING AS A SOAP BUBBLE. "PEACE NOW" RALLIES AND

EDITORIAL SOUL-SEARCHING SHOW THAT ISRAELI SOCIETY IS PAINFULLY
STRUGGLING WITH
ITS DILEMMAS. BUT BEGIN'S COALITION IS VERY MUCH INTACT,
AND ULTIMATELY OUR STRATEGY SHOULD REMAIN FOCUSED ON
HOW TO DEAL WITH HIM AND HIS GOVERNMENT MOST EFFECTIVELY.

13. THE ONE THING I AM MOST CERTAIN ABOUT IN WHAT IS
CLEARLY A VERY COMPLEX SITUATION IS THAT WE SHOULD NOT
COME OUT PUBLICLY WITH AN AMERICAN PLAN IN THE NEXT
MONTH OR PERHAPS TWO. IF WE WERE TO DO SO BEFORE
HAVING GIVEN BOTH DAYAN AND WEIZMAN THE CHANCE TO PUCH AS
FAR AS POSSIBLE DOWN THEIR PARALLES BUT SEPARATE TRACKS,
WE WOULD BE SETTING UP A SITUATION IN WHICH THE ISRAELIS
AND ALL OF THEIR AMERICN SUPPORTERS CAN TOO CREDIBLY
ACCUSE THE ADMINISTRATION OF GROSS UNFAIRNESS, AND
THIS WILL ONLY FURTHER COMPLICATE THE ROAD TO OUR ULTIMATE
OBJECTIVE.
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